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Article 5

Chandler v. James: A Student's Right of Prayer in Public
Schools *
I. INTRODUCTION

As our nation recovers from the shock and horror of the recent shootings occurring at Columbine High and other public schools 1, some point
to these events as evidence that public schools suffer from a lack of religious spirituality that comes from organized prayer. 2 While religious expression in public schools continues to be a heated issue, these tragic
events provide new emotional ammunition for proponents of school
prayer. Since Engel v. Vitale, 3 courts have struggled to articulate how
students can express themselves religiously in the public school arena. 4
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 5
the Supreme Court first used the widely recognizable phrase that "students [do not] shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gate." 6 But the Supreme Court left unanswered the more difficult questions of determining exactly what rights students are allowed to bring
with them into the schoolhouse. Through subsequent years, the Supreme
Court has set boundaries for lower courts to follow. At one end of the
spectrum, the Supreme Court has allowed students to pray privately or as
a group; 7 at the other end, the Court has restricted officially sponsored
*

Copyright © 2001 by Howard M. Baik.
I. See An Epidemic of Violence, (visited March 8, 2001) <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03-

/08/alarming.incidents/index.html>. These shootings include, but are not limited to, the Feb. 29,
2000 incident at Buell Elementary School in Mt. Morris Township, Michigan, where a six-year-old
shot to death another first grader; the Nov. 19, 1999 shooting at Deming Middle School in Deming,
New Mexico, where a 12-year-old shot and killed another student; the May 26, 2000 incident at
Lake Worth Middle School in Palm Beach County, Florida where a 13-year-old shot and killed his
English teacher. These incidents occurred after the infamous shootings in Pearl, Mississippi; Paducah, Kentucky; and Littleton, Colorado.
2. See Betsy Hart, Tragedy Puts Prayer in School, DESERET NEWS, April 30, 1999, at A IS.
3. 370U.S.421 (1962).
4. Compare Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (upholding the practice of choosing a volunteer student to give a graduation prayer), with Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding graduation
prayer unconstitutional because of the state's involvement), and ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l
Bd. of Educ., 84 F. 3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (contradicting the Jones decision, which does not permit
graduation prayer where the students vote whether to have prayer).
5. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6. /d. at 506.
7. See id. at 513.
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school prayer. 8 However, the area between these two extremes continues
to be unclear. In Chandler v. James, 9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit provided guidance to its lower courts regarding "the religious speech in public school" 10 question by holding that a school district does not violate the Establishment Clause when the district allows
students to initiate religious speech in schools and at school-related
events. This speech is in fact protected under the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Chandler, even with its shortcomings, provides a helpful framework from which to analyze cases involving religious speech in public schools. While the Supreme Court in Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe 11 has recently decided against religious speech (prayer) before football games, its holding is fact-specific
and does not contradict the ruling or analysis presented in the Chandler
case.
To begin, this Note provides a brief background of the pertinent judicial history involving prayer in schools and is followed by an examination of the different ways several federal circuit courts have decided
school prayer cases after the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman.12 This Note then gives a short introduction to Chandler v. James,
followed by an explanation of the reasoning behind the Chandler court's
decision and examination of how the Eleventh Circuit's ruling sits in relation to other circuit court decisions. In addition, the Note explores the
significance of state-sponsored control in determining a First Amendment violation. It further addresses the question of what constitutes student-initiated speech and what type of limitations a school can place
upon it. Reference is made to the Equal Access Act and the principle of
limited public forums in providing a useful support of the Chandler
analysis for school prayer cases. Finally, this Note argues that the recent
Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe does not void the Chandler analysis
and that such analysis should be looked to as a valuable tool for examining issues of prayer in our public schools.

8.
9.
I 0.
II.
12.

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
180 F.3d 1254 (lith Cir. 1999).
/d. at 1254.
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Violation of the Establishment Clause Under Lee v. Weisman

In 1962, the Supreme Court decided in Engle v. Vitale 13 that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 14 prohibited schoolsponsored prayer. Since Engle, lower courts have struggled to deal with
variations of religious speech in the classroom. 15 In 1992, the Supreme
Court helped to clarify some questions by ruling in Lee v. Weisman that
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment
Clause. 16
In Weisman, a principal invited a rabbi to give the invocation and
benediction at a middle school graduation ceremony with instructions
that the prayers needed to be nonsectarian. 17 Regardless of the nonsectarian nature of the prayers, the Court ruled that the "government involvement with religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public
school." 18 Moreover, in deciding this case, the Court focused on several
factors: the control of the school over the graduation ceremony, the
selection of the speaker, the school's attempt to control the content of the
prayer by instructing that it be nonsectarian, and the essentially obligatory attendance of the students. 19 In addressing these factors, the Court
concluded that the degree of school involvement related to the graduation
prayer gave a clear impression of state support. 20
Less than a year after the Weisman case, the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v.
Clear Creek Independent School District, allowed a student to voluntarily give a graduation prayer after a majority of the graduating seniors

13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Supreme Court ruled in this early prayer case that "New York
state's prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer."
!d. at 430. The Court held that this was a violation of the Establishment Clause even though it was
argued that the prayer to be offered was nondenominational in form and the program would allow
students to choose to remain silent or leave the room. See id. The Court emphasized that even if a
prayer is denominationally neutral and students can choose to participate, the First Amendment prevents any type of government sponsorship of the establishment of religion. See id.
14. The First Amendment of the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The Establishment Clause refers to the phrase, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See supra note 4.
16. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
17. See id. at 581.
18. /d. at 587.
19. See id. at 586-88.
20. See id. at 590.
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voted for it. 21 The court, while using a similar line of reasoning as in
Weisman, emphasized the factual differences between the two cases. 22
Specifically, the court focused on the control of the majority vote of the
senior class in determining whether to initiate a graduation prayer. 23 This
differs from Weisman because there the school not only selected who
was to give the prayer, but also attempted to control the content of the
24
prayer. In Jones, the student vote was an important part of the court's
determination that the school did not direct prayer at its graduation, and
25
thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. Critics of the Fifth Circuit's ruling believe that the decision grossly misreads the Supreme
26
Court's ruling in Weisman. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused
to grant review of the Jones case, and the question whether studentinitiated prayer through majority vote is constitutionally permitted remains uncertain in some cases. 27 Since Jones, federal courts other than
the Fifth Circuit have examined cases regarding student-initiated
28
prayers. However, the decisions have varied and reflect the lack of clarity and uniformity regarding state control and student-initiated speech.
B. Confusion Among the Circuit Courts

The Weisman decision, although helpful in further shaping the law
regarding prayer in public schools, left unanswered the important question as to whether the ban on school prayer encompasses student-initiated
graduation prayers or simply applies to those prayers directed and con29
trolled by school officials. The discrepancies among the decisions of
the various appellate courts reflect this confusion.
Jones was one of the earlier appellate cases to address prayer after
30
the Weisman decision. However, in 1995, the Third Circuit heard a
21. See Jones, 971 F.2d at 963.
22. See id. at 969-71.
23. See id. at 969,971-72.
24. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 586-88.
25. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 971-72.
26. See ACLU Legal Bulletin, The Establishment Clause and Public School (visited Feb. 21,
2001) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/religion/pr3.html>. The ACLU bulletin argues that the Court in
Weisman emphasized that schools maintain a substantial amount of control during a graduation
ceremony. See id. Because of this control, when a school reserves time on the program for prayer, it
essentially is endorsing the prayer regardless of whether a voluntary student offers it. Thus, the state
violates the Constitution.
27. See id. The Supreme Court in Santa Fe attempted to clarify this issue, but the cases remain fact intensive and therefore distinguishable. See infra discussion Part IV.F.
28. Compare Jones., 971 F.2d at 963, and Harris, 4 I F. 3d at 447, with Black Horse, 84 F. 3d
at I47I, and Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 32I, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998).
29. See Ralph Mawdsley, Student Choice and Graduation Prayer: Division Among the Circuits, I 29 EDUC. LAW REP. 553 ( 1998).
30. See Jones, 971 F.2d at 963.
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similar case, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, in
which a school allowed the graduating seniors to vote for prayer at the
graduation. 31 Black Horse factually differed from Jones in that students
in Black Horse were allowed to vote for prayer, no prayer, or a moment
of reflection. 32 Interestingly, the Black Horse court reached an opposite
conclusion from the Fifth Circuit in Jones. In Jones, the student vote was
interpreted as a method of eliminating the school's entanglement with
prayer, 33 while the court in Black Horse determined that even a student
referendum could not "erase the state's imprint from this graduation
34
prayer." The court determined that delegating one facet of the graduation ceremony, the choice for a graduation prayer, would not relieve the
school of its ultimate control over the event or "insulate the School
Board from the reach of the First Amendment." 35 The court further emphasized that students are able to determine the existence of a graduation
prayer only because the school gives them this opportunity. 36 The Third
Circuit prohibited graduation prayer even when a plurality of stu~ents
voted for it. 37
In another recent circuit court case involving graduation prayer,
Doe v. Madison School District No. 321, the Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth
38
Circuit in Jones, upheld student choice and graduation prayer. However, this case factually differs from both Jones and Black Horse in that
the students did not vote on the decision to have a graduation prayer. 39
Instead, the school selected speakers based on academic standing and left
it up to the students to decide the topic of their speeches. 40 In referring to
the Weisman case, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance that the
Supreme Court placed on the degree of school involvement with the
graduation prayers in deciding an Establishment Clause violation. 41 The
Ninth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning as the Jones interpretation of Weisman and indicated that the facts in Madison showed that the

31. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1471.
32. See id. at 1475.
33. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 970-71.
34. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479.
35. /d. (indicating that the Weisman case presented an obvious example of the state's entanglement with religion. Though the involvement of the state in this case is less obvious, the court emphasizes that even a student vote cannot eliminate the school's endorsement of religion from the
graduation prayer.)
36. See id.
37. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1471.
38. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 832.
39. See id. at 834.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 835.
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42
control over prayer was with the students and not the State. Thus, if selection of a student speaker is based solely on the neutral criterion of
academic standing, the student may engage in prayer or religious discus.

SIOn.

43

On July 13, 1999, the Eleventh Circuit decided another case involving school prayer, Chandler v. James. 44 Factually, this case can be distinguished from the above-mentioned circuit court cases in that no student vote or school selection of a graduation speaker is directly
45
involved. Instead, the contention surrounds a broad Alabama statute
permitting nonsectarian student-initiated prayer at mandatory and non46
mandatory events. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Alabama issued an injunction against the statute ruling that it was unconstitutional.47 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the injunction was
too broad. In narrowing the scope of the injunction, the court held that
prayers could be allowed at events such as graduations and school as48
semblies, even if mandatory attendance is required.
III. CHANDLER V. JAMES

A. Facts
In 1996, a vice-principal Michael Chandler and his son, a student in
the DeKalb Alabama County school system (DeKalb ), challenged the validity of an Alabama statute which read: "On public school, other public,
or other property, nonsectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer, invocation and/or benedictions, shall be permitted during
compulsory or non-compulsory . . . school-related graduation or com49
mencement ceremonies, and other school-related student events." The
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of
50
the C:mndlers and held the statute unconstitutional. The court further

42. See id.
43. See id. at 836. However, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case where a
student was prohibited from delivering a graduation speech in which he referenced God and other
religious sentiments. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied Niemeyer v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist, _U.S._, 2001 WL 15969 (March 5,
2001). The Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit decision, which affirmed the district court's decision of allowing the school district to prohibit the speech.
44. 180 F.3d 1254 (I I th Cir. 1999).
45. See id.
46. See id. at 1255.
47. See id. at 1256-57.
48. See id. at 1264-67.
49. /d. at 1256 (quoting Ala. Code§ 16-l-20.3(b) (I 995)).
50. See id.
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ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting DeKalb from officially sanc51
tioning "vocal prayer or other devotional speech in its schools." It further "prohibit[ed] all [school sanctioned, induced and ordered] prayer or
other devotional speech in situations which are not purely private, such
as aloud in the classroom, over the public address system, or as part of
the program at school-related assemblies and sporting events, or at a
graduation ceremony." 52
DeKalb conceded that the Supreme Court's decision in Weisman
prohibited school sponsorship, prescription, and endorsement of religion
in curricular or extracurricular activities. 53 However, the injunction went
so far as to require school officials to not only abstain from leading or
participating in public prayer or other religious speech, "but also t'equires
[them] to forbid students or other private individuals from doing so while
in school or at school-related events." 54 It is this part of the injunction
that DeKalb appealed. DeKalb did not challenge the district court's ruling of the unconstitutionality of the Alabama statute55 and that issue will
not be examined in this paper. 56
The only question the Eleventh Circuit reviewed was "whether the
district court may constitutionally enjoin DeKalb from permitting student-initiated religious speech in its schools." 57 In addressing this question, the appellate court directly tackled one of the issues left unclear after Weisman.

B. Reasoning of Appellate Court
The Chandlers argued that all religious speech in public schools,
even if student-initiated, should be prohibited under the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 58 Their argument consisted of two main
contentions. First, they contend that no difference exists between state
prayer and student-initiated prayer in public schools and that both give
the impression of state endorsement. 59 Second, they argue that all public
religious speech in schools is unconstitutional because of its coercive nature and resulting peer pressure on some of the school's students. 60 The
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
Wallace v.
57.
58.
59.
60.

/d. at 1257.
/d.
See id.
/d.
See id.
To better understand the history surrounding this Alabama statute and others like it, see
Smith, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Chandler, 180 F. 3d at 1258.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1260.
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Supreme Court in Weisman focused on exactly these two concerns in its
ruling against graduation prayer. 61 However, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the arguments the Chandlers proposed and ruled that the district court may not prevent DeKalb from allowing student-initiated religious speech in its schools. 62
The court emphasized that "[t]he suppression of student-initiated religious speech is neither necessary to, nor does it achieve, constitutional
neutrality towards religion. For that reason, the Constitution does not
permit its suppression." 63 Further, the court stated that "[b]ecause genuinely student-initiated religious speech is private speech endorsing religion, it is fully protected by both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech
Clauses of the Constitution."64 To discriminate against student religious
speech would be to demonstrate outright hostility towards religion,
which the Freedom of Expression Clause of the First Amendment
proh1"b"Its. 65
In referring to the famous Supreme Court decision in Tinker, 66 the
court reiterated the principle that students do not leave their constitutional rights "at the schoolhouse gate." 67 But as the introduction of this
note indicates, the problem lies in determining which rights students retain after entering the schoolyard. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, religious speech by a student outside the public school arena "does not become forbidden 'state action' the moment the students walk through the
schoolhouse door." 68 In Weisman, the school's high degree of control
over the prayer, speech content, and selection of the graduation speaker
was a determining factor in the Court's ruling against graduation
prayer. 69 In allowing religious speech in graduation ceremonies, the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits in Jones and Madison, respectively, decided that the
control of the prayer was with the students and not the state. 70 In Jones,
the students voted for the graduation prayer,71 and in Madison the speakers were selected by neutral factors and were given the freedom to
choose whatever speech topic they preferred. 72 The Eleventh Circuit fol-

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Weisman, 505 U.S. 577.
See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258.
/d. at 1261.
!d.
See id. at 1261.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
/d. at 1261-62.
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
See Jones, 971 F.2d at 963; Madison, 147 F.3d at 832.
See Jones, 971 F.2d at 964-65.
See Madison, 147 F.3d at 834.
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lowed a similar line of reasoning, finding that the government must remain neutral with respect to religion. 73 The Chandler court maintained
that genuinely student-initiated speech does not become state sponsored
74
simply because it takes place in public schools.
The Chandler court stated that simply permitting religious speech in
schools does not equate to state control and endorsement of religion prohibited by the Constitution. 75 Although the court acknowledged the possibility that permitting student-initiated religious speech might advance
religion in some sense, it emphasized the assertion that "[s]tate action
76
may incidentally advance religion without offending the ConstitutioP "
Therefore, the Chandler court ruled that the district court could not constitutionally restrict students from engaging in genuinely student-initiated
religious speech and vacated the permanent injunction. 77
IV. ANALYSIS

A. State-Sponsored Control of Graduation Events
In the wake of the Supreme Court's Weisman decision, the question
still remained whether the ban on school prayer encompassed studentinitiated graduation prayers or simply applied to graduations under the
management and direct control of school officials. While circuit courts
have dealt with this issue, 78 the Eleventh Circuit directly addressed this
question by indicating that student-initiated religious speech in public
schools, free from the direct control of school officials, is not state prayer
and therefore is constitutional. 79 Critics will argue that no real distinction
exists between a school controlling a religious activity and merely delegating that control to its students. In fact, the Third Circuit upheld this
viewpoint in ruling that student-initiated and student-led prayer at
graduation is unconstitutional because the ceremony remains a schoolsponsored event under the control of school officials. 8° Further, the
Weisman decision clearly indicated that merely delegating the decision
regarding one or two segments of the graduation ceremony does not diminish the state sponsorship. 81
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Chandler. 180 F.3d at 1261.
See id. at 1261-62.
See id. at 1262.
/d. at 1262 (alluding to Widmarv. Vicent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).
See id. at 1263-66.
See supra note 4.
See Chandler, 180 F.3d. at 1264-65.
See Black Horse, 84 F. 3d at 1471.
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577.
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It is true that at a graduation ceremony, "teachers and principals must
and do retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of the
program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the decorum of the students" 82 However, the Eleventh Circuit aptly addressed
this concern by first acknowledging that the Constitution requires neutrality, and later explaining that permitting students to speak religiously
83
signifies neither state approval nor disapproval of that speech. One
cannot attribute state establishment or sponsorship of religion simply because a school gave permission for students to speak on a religious
topic. 84 The Chandler court took this principle a step further when it
stated that the religious speech could even advance religion in some
sense without violating the Constitution. 85 The court's reasoning is sound
because it strikes a balance between state establishment of religion and a
complete rejection of it in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
B. Student Impressionability
A concern that arose in Weisman was student impressionability in
86
believing school prayer would be equated with state-sponsored prayer.
However, this concern seems misguided. In Westside Community School
v. Mergens, 87 the Supreme Court accepted the belief that "secondary
school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a
school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits
on a nondiscriminatory basis." 88
While the court in Weisman worried about the coercive effect religious speech could have on the students, 89 in a purely pragmatic sense, it
is difficult to imagine a graduating senior who would see a graduation
prayer or religious reference in a speech as anything but part of the tradition and ceremony that has been previously established. High school seniors are mature enough to realize that the school does not sponsor every
speech it permits. As the dissent in Weisman indicated, our nation's history and tradition is filled with public ceremonies involving prayers. 90
Americans witness prayers at government ceremonies and presidential
inaugurations, and congressional sessions open with a chaplain's

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

/d. at 597.
See Chandler, 180F.3dat 1261.
See id. at 1262.
See id.
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 578, 593-94.
496 U.S. 226 (1990).
/d. at 250.
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587-88, 592-93.
See id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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prayer--even the legal tender of the United States is printed with the
words "in God we trust." 91 In some public schools, students begin the
day by reciting the pledge of allegiance, which directly references God.
Graduation ceremonies have a long history and association with prayer. 92
Prayers at graduation ceremonies are pervasive and are expected to accompany the traditional graduation ritual. 93 If a graduation prayer is coercive, it is no more coercive than reciting the pledge of allegiance in our
schools or using currency upon which the words "in God we trust" is
written. A school can mitigate any impression of sponsored prayer with
disclaimers printed on programs and read at the beginning of such ceremonies. Because the remedy for such concern is simple, it is unnecessary
to prohibit religious references and student-initiated prayer outright.
C. Limits on Student-Initiated Speech

The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that genuinely student-initiated
speech is protected by the Free Exercise and the Free Speech Clauses of
94
the First Amendment. However, questions arise as to what constitutes
student-initiated speech and what type of limitations, if any, a school can
place upon it. Some courts explore student-initiated speech as a product
of a state's lack or limited degree of contro1. 95 In fact, the lack of state
control seems to characterize student-initiated speech. 96 However, defining what is student-initiated speech becomes more difficult when that
speech occurs in a forum of government or state control. Courts struggle
with defining the point where state control over the forum would change
student-initiated speech into a form of state speech, regardless if that
speech was initiated and voluntarily given by students. 97
Another concern with allowing student-initiated speech is the potential for abuse. Consider a situation where, in order to avoid statesponsored religion, a court prohibits a teacher from leading a school
choir in religiously oriented Christmas songs at a school holiday assembly. Instead of abiding by the restriction, the teacher/music director allows a voluntary student to take over the leading and directing of those
particular religious songs. 98 Is this speech student-initiated or simply a

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
Mergens,
96.
97.
98.

/d. at 634.
See id. at 635-36.
See id.
See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261.
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590-91; Chandler, 180 F. 3d at 1264; Westside Comm. Sch. v.
496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990).
See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590-91; Chandler, 180 F. 3d at 1264.
See id.
See Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542 (lOth Cir. 1997).
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way in which schools can get around the First Amendment and indirectly
sponsor religious expression?
The Eleventh Circuit does not define the bounds of student-initiated
speech99 but other circuit courts have wrestled with whether a student
majority vote falls under the umbrella of speech that is studentinitiated.100 The Fifth and Third Circuits dealt with this issue and came to
different conclusions. 101 However, it seems clear that allowing a majority
of a group to impose their religious beliefs on individuals who do not
share those beliefs runs contrary to the purpose of the Establishment
Clause. 102 The Supreme Court has stated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights ma(c not be submitted to vote; they depend on
03
the outcome of no elections.

Thus, it seems that even a ninety-nine percent majority vote should not
be allowed if the effect results in imposing beliefs on those who do not
share the same beliefs.
The second question that arises is what limits, if any, a school can
place on student-initiated speech. This is an important question since
schools play a crucial in loco parentis role and must be able to restrict
speech that disrupts the school's education and teaching goals. 104 The
Chandler court attempted to answer this question by referring to the
Equal Access Act and stating that religious speech must be "without
oversight, without supervision, subject only to the same reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions as all other student speech in school." 105
This seems to give neither standard, practical guidance nor a bright-line
rule for schools to follow. However, a more extensive analysis of the
Equal Access Act and the theory of "limited open forums" 106 provides
clearer and more concrete guidance.
99. See Chandler, 180 F. 3d 1254.
100. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. at 290. See infra Part IV.F.
10 I. See supra note 4.
102. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624. See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-226
( 1963) (holding that the State cannot permit the majority to "use the machinery of the state to practice its beliefs").
103. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
104. See Byron Fisher, Class Lecture for Law and Public Education Seminar at the J. Reuben
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (November 1999).
105. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65.
106. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994).
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D. Applying the Equal Access Act to School Prayer
Congress passed the Equal Access Act in 1984 to end "perceived
107
widespread discrimination" against religious speech in public schools.
The Supreme Court, in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 108 later
upheld the constitutionality of the Act and ruled it to be within the
bounds of the Establishment Clause. 109 The Equal Access Act allows
equal access to school facilities and prohibits discrimination based on
speech content. 110 The Act sets forth the principle of a limited public forum and designates a public secondary school as such "whenever such
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time." 111 In other words, if a school allows one club to meet on
campus, then it creates a limited open forum and must allow all other
clubs on campus as well. A school is not allowed to restrict access based
on the content or viewpoint of the clubs or speakers. 112 However, the
school may close the forum at any time by prohibiting all clubs from
meeting on school grounds. 113 In Salt Lake City, Utah, East High School
chose to do this rather than allow a gay and lesbian club equal access to
its facilities. 114
Whether or not a school graduation is a limited open forum will be
subject to debate. Although a strong analogous argument can be made
that if a school allows a student to speak on one topic, then a type of limited open forum is created. Therefore, other topics should be allowed as
well. Speeches at school graduation events often have similar themes of
nostalgia, goals and dreams. But if a school allows a speaker to speak on
a particular topic of his or her choice, then it can be argued that a limited
open forum is established and the school must allow other topics as well,
including religion. Although the school sponsors the graduation ceremony, and directs or controls the overall event, the school would not
control the students' choice of speech content or material.

107. Catherine A. Loveless, Recent Developments, After-School Use of Public Elementary
and Junior High School Facilities by Student Religious Groups, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 297 (1995).
108. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
109. See id.
I 10. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994).
I I I. See id. § 407l(b).
I 12. See ACLU Legal Bulletin, The Establishment Clause and Public Schools (visited Feb.
2 I, 200 I) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/religion/pr3.html>.
I 13. See id.
I 14. See Jennifer Toomer-Cook, State Office Backs S.L. School District, DESERET NEWS,
April 21, 1998, at 83; Chip Parkinson, Judge Will Hear Suit Against State Senators, DESERET
NEWS, May I 7, I 996, at 84.
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While the Equal Access Act prohibits schools from sponsoring, participating in, directing or controlling the activities of the student
groups, 115 the schools still maintain general control over the school facilities. For instance, the school establishes the time during which certain
rooms can be used and still provides the electricity for the meetings,
desks and other supplies that might be used. A similar analogy can be
made in regard to student-initiated speeches. A school controls the sequence of the speakers, the printing of the programs and other supplies.
The general control over the graduation belongs to the school, but student-initiated speeches and the voluntary choice of religious expression
remains in the hands and control of the students. This line of reasoning
reaches a similar conclusion as the Chandler court in allowing studentinitiated speeches at graduation ceremonies. The concern expressed in
Weisman over conveying the impression of state sponsorship over religious speeches 116 could be dealt with by a simple disclaimer or announcement at the beginning of the ceremony or by printing a disclaimer
in the graduation programs handed to students and the audience.
Another area in which the Equal Access Act might be helpful is in
determining limitations on student-initiated speech. A concern that arises
with the decision in Jones is the extent to which students will be allowed
to engage in student-initiated speech. Will students be allowed to speak
freely on all topics as long as they are student-initiated? It was this concern that brought down the Religious Freedom Amendment Act of
1998. 117 Because of the public's concern that federal courts had misinterpreted the Constitution by issuing rulings that severely restrict religious
expression, 118 Congressman Ernest Istook (R-Oklahoma) sponsored the
Religious Freedom Amendment in an attempt to protect religious free-

115. See 20 U.S.C. § 407l(c)(l)-(5) (1994).
116. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590-91.
117. See H.R.J. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1998). The Religious Freedom Amendment did not pass
in the House of Representatives. The amendment was sixty-one votes short of reaching the twothirds majority to amend the Constitution (224 against and 203 in favor). See id. The purpose of the
Amendment was to "restore the right of religious persons to acknowledge their beliefs, heritage, and
an equal opportunity to participate in government programs, activities, or benefits. The Religious
Freedom Amendment (RFA) would prohibit Federal and state governments from establishing any
religion or denying equal access to a benefit because of religious affiliation." H.R. REP. No. I 05543, at I ( 1998). The Amendment would have allowed, among other things, sectarian prayers in the
classroom, personal religious opinions given by teachers during class hours, and prayers at high
school graduation ceremonies. This amendment was in response to the public's concern that the Supreme Court and lower courts have misinterpreted the Constitution by issuing rulings that severely
restrict religious expression when other forms of free speech are not so restricted, and which result in
discrimination against a religious viewpoint in public affairs. See H.R. REP. No. 105-543, at I
(1998).
118. Carrie A. Moore, School Prayers, DESERET NEWS, April 25, 1998, at A 15.
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dom.

119

However, unlike the Equal Access Act, the Religious Freedom

Amendment failed to gamer enough votes for ratification. 120
Doug Bates, the director of School Law and Legislation for the Utah
State Office of Education and a critic of the amendment, expressed his
concern that the amendment would allow tolerance of prayers, even
those referencing praise to Satan. "If you're going to permit [school
prayer], you have to permit it all .... "l21
This same concern is raised in Chandler. The Eleventh Circuit allowed religious expression in schools and at school-related and schoolsponsored events as long as the expression was student-initiated, even at
mandatory events. 122 However, the court did not define the limits of religious expression nor did it give any indication of what is religious. 123 An
assumption can be made that the religious expression envisioned was that
of the mainstream religions and formalities. There could be a rare but
possible situation in which a student claims Satanism is his or her religion and praises Satan in prayer. Although this example is extreme and
might rarely occur, it begs the question of just how far the Chandler
court is willing to extend its decision.
Critics may claim that as long as the speech was student-initiated,
there does not seem to be any limits to stop it. The Chandler court does
not entirely ignore this issue. The court does provide some guidance in
deciding this question by indicating that religious speech must be "subject ... to the reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions as all other
student speech in school." 124 This guideline, however, is subject to broad
interpretations. A better guideline on restricting student-initiated speech
can be found by again looking to the Equal Access Act. The Act allows
for groups to meet on a school's premises only if their meeting does not
"materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educa125
This same principle, applied to student-initiated
tional activities. "
speeches, would sufficiently regulate speech that might cause disruption
in public schools. The example of the Satanic speech would likely fall
under the regulatory arms of the school and could be excluded accordingly.
Therefore, the Equal Access Act, which the Supreme Court has already ruled constitutional and within the bounds of the Establishment

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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H.R. REP. No. 105-543.
See Moore, supra note 118.
/d.
See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258-64.
See id. at 1254.
/d. at 1264-65.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (1994).
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Clause, 126 and the concomitant limited open forum principle proves useful in analyzing whether student-initiated speech should be allowed in
public schools and in providing helpful guidelines to answer lingering
uncertainties left in the wake of Weisman. Under the Equal Access Act,
any meetings that take place on school facilities must be voluntary and
student-initiated; no sponsorship by the school is allowed; no employees
or agents of the school are allowed to participate, direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend the activities of the student groups. 127 These provisions, along with the other restrictions and guidelines of the Equal Access Act previously mentioned, provide useful tools in examining issues
of student-initiated free speech in the context of a graduation ceremony.
E. Official Involvement
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that as long as prayer is not controlled
and encouraged by school officials, it is protected speech and should be
allowed. 128 In this way, the court avoids addressing another problematic
issue involving school prayer.
A problem with past court decisions requiring nonsectarian prayer is
that the very suggestion of nonsectarian prayer requires someone to review the prayer to make sure it is nonsectarian. This poses obvious problems of censorship and biases favoring one religion over another as to
what is and what is not appropriate religious speech. The Supreme Court
has clearly indicated that this is not allowed. 129 Having an organization
decide what is and is not acceptable presents additional problems besides
the constitutional restrictions. Religious expressions that do not fall
within the recognizable and acceptable framework of the majority might
be relegated to pariah status and never permitted. For example, a policymaking body located in the Bible Belt of the Southeastern United States
might permit a Baptist-style prayer, but decide that any other variations
of prayer are not acceptable. The Chandler court wisely focuses on student-initiated religious speech and therefore bypasses this issue. 130
Technically, the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler merely restricted the
broad permanent injunction issued by the district court. However, in
reaching its decision the court set forth an analysis and holding that
seems to support the rights of students to initiate religious speech in public schools. Although the Supreme Court declared in Tinker that "students [do not] shed their Constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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Westside, 496 U.S. at 226.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1994).
Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Chandler, 180 F.3d 1254.
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gate," 131 there may be some rights students do not possess even before
they enter the school. 132

F. Recent Supreme Court Decision: Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that as long as prayer is not controlled
and encouraged by school officials, it is protected speech and should be
allowed. Recently, the Supreme Court decided a case involving prayer
before public football games. In Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, 133 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, preventing student-led invocations before the start of public school football games.
The Santa Fe case involved a challenge to the Santa Fe School District's policy of allowing prayers to be delivered over the public address
system before home football games. 134 The process involved two majoritarian elections: the first determined whether an invocation would be
given, and the second selected the student who would deliver the message.135
While the outcome of this case seems to run contrary to the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Chandler, which seems to expand prayer in schools,
a close analysis of both cases reveals that Santa Fe does not overrule the
decision of Chandler. After the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe,
the Court remanded the Chandler case to the Eleventh Circuit for further
evaluation in light of its recent decision. 136 The Eleventh Circuit's own
analysis provides the best explanation as to why Santa Fe and Chandler
are not in conflict: "So long as the prayer is genuinely student-initiated,
and not the product of any school policy which actively or surreptitiously
encourages it, the speech is private and it is protected." 137
131. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
132. Many Supreme Court decisions have given less constitutional protection to minors than
adults in similar situations. See John Thompson, Student Religious Groups and the Right of Access
to Public School Activity Periods, 74 GEO. L.J. 205, 219 n.88 (1985) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that high school officials are able to search
students without probable cause or a search warrant); Ingraham v. Wright, 43 U.S. 651, 671 (1977)
(holding that Eighth Amendment does not prohibit Florida law from allowing corporal punishment
of school children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (stating that New York law
against prohibiting the selling of sexually oriented magazines to minors does not violate the limited
first amendment rights of the minors); id. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that in some specific areas, children do not have a full capacity for individual choice which triggers first amendment
guarantees).
133. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). The Supreme Court was split 6-3.
134. See id. at 290.
135. See id. at 290-91.
136. See Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F. 3d 1313 (II'" Cir. 2000).
137. /d.at1316.
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In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that state-sponsored prayer before football games is not allowed. 138 The Court reached this conclusion
by determining that the speech being offered in this particular case was
not private but public speech. 139 Determining whether speech is private
or public is difficult, especially in the public school arena. Public schools
must remain neutral but the line between neutrality and state sponsorship
of religion is often blurred, putting a greater emphasis on the factual
analysis and circumstances of each case. In Santa Fe, the Court determined that the process by which a student was selected and allowed to
give a prayer involved a great degree of school involvement, so much involvement, in fact, that the line was crossed from neutrality to state sponsorship of religion. 140 When this line was crossed, the speech was no
longer private and therefore not protected by the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses. 141 In determining school control, the Court focused on
several facts including the school board's adoption of the policy allowing
for a message or invocation to be delivered before football games to solemnize the event. The Court also focused on the majoritarian election
process by which a student would be elected to give a message. 142
While the opinion does place limits on student-led and studentinitiated invocations in public schools, it is important to note that the Supreme Court's ruling does not extend to all student-initiated and studentled speech that would otherwise be private. 143 In Santa Fe, the Supreme
Court was particularly concerned about the majority vote by which
speakers and topics were selected. The Supreme Court was concerned
that by allowing decisions to be left to a student body majority, the minority voice would be stifled. 144 But the Supreme Court left open the
possibility of student-led messages in situations similar to that in Doe v.
Madison School District No. 321, where a school selects a speaker based
on neutral grounds such as academic standing and allows the student to
decide the topic of the speech. 145
The Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing the Chandler decision in light of
Santa Fe, appropriately concluded that Chandler does not contradict
Santa Fe but complements the decision by helping to answer questions
as to what circumstances religious speech in schools should be consid-
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ered private and thus protected. 146 The Eleventh Circuit ruled in Chandler, and reaffirmed in Siegelman, that as long as prayer is "genuinely
student-initiated" and not controlled and encouraged by school officials,
it is private and therefore protected speech, and should be allowed in
147
public schools. The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe, ruled against prayer
148
precisely because it was not "genuinely student-initiated." It was controlled and encouraged by school officials. Thus, the Court decided that
149
the speech was not private and not protected. The Eleventh Circuit appropriately concluded that Santa Fe and Chandler are not contradictory.
Thus, the Chandler decision and analysis remain valid.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Chandler decision highlights some important questions with
which courts continue to struggle with after the Supreme Court's decision in Weisman. The Eleventh Circuit gives wide latitude for studentinitiated speech in public schools as long as they are truly initiated by
150
students and do not bear "the imprint of the state." Questions do arise
as to how far a court will go in allowing various topics of student speech.
In fact, the recent Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe does provide
more specific limitations in this regard, which were then elaborated upon
in Seigelman.
Chandler ruled and Seigelman reaffirmed that student-initiated
speech is private speech and therefore protected. The Supreme Court
does not contradict this principle with its decision in Santa Fe. As the
Eleventh Circuit appropriately decided in reviewing its decision in light
of Santa Fe, "[s]o long as the prayer is genuinely student-initiated, and
not the product of any school policy which actively or surreptitiously en151
courages it, the speech is private and it is protected."

Howard M. Baik
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